If you served on a jury in a criminal case — particularly one involving violence, sexual assault, abuse, or the death of a child or adult — you may be feeling things you didn’t expect. This guide is for you. It explains what those reactions are, what helps, and where to find support.

A note before we begin: every resource listed here serves men, women, and people of all gender identities. Some of the organizations have the word “Women” in their name for historical reasons, but they explicitly serve all genders, all ages, and all kinds of trauma exposure. If you are a male juror reading this, please do not skip past those resources. They are for you, too.

You did something hard.
You served on a jury. You may not have asked for the case you were given. You may have heard graphic testimony, seen disturbing photographs, watched video evidence, or listened to a survivor describe what happened to them. You may have looked at autopsy reports, crime scene images, or recordings you cannot now un-see.

And then, when it was over, you went home.

There was no debrief. No one walked you through what you had just absorbed. The court thanked you for your service, the bailiff dismissed you, and the rest of the world expected you to pick your kids up from school, go to the grocery store, and answer emails as if nothing had changed.

Something did change. This guide is here to help you understand what you may be feeling, why it is happening, and what you can do about it.

Part 1: What is Happening to Me?

Secondary traumatic stress is real.

You don’t have to be the victim of a crime to be affected by one. Researchers, therapists, and trauma specialists have known for decades that exposure to graphic descriptions and images of violence — even from a distance — can produce real psychological symptoms. This is sometimes called secondary trauma, vicarious trauma, or, when it persists, secondary traumatic stress.

It is well-documented in groups that face this kind of exposure as part of their work: emergency room staff, child protective services workers, war reporters, criminal defense and prosecution teams, and jurors in serious cases.

If you are noticing changes in how you feel, sleep, think, or relate to people since your trial ended, you are not weak. You are not broken. You are having a normal human reaction to abnormal information. This is true regardless of your gender, age, profession, or how “tough” you usually are.

Common reactions after exposure to traumatic material:

• Intrusive thoughts or flashbacks of testimony, photos, or evidence
• Nightmares or disrupted sleep
• Difficulty concentrating or remembering things
• Trouble functioning at work, at home, or at school
• Sleeping or eating too much, or too little
• Strained relationships with family, friends, or coworkers
• Sadness, anger, irritability, or guilt
• Feeling emotionally numb, or feeling everything too intensely
• Hypervigilance — checking locks, scanning crowds, distrusting strangers
• Shaken assumptions about safety, fairness, or human nature
• Physical symptoms: headaches, nausea, fatigue, racing heart

Most of these reactions ease within a few weeks. Some take longer. A small number become persistent enough that they need professional attention. Knowing the difference is the first step.

Why jurors are particularly vulnerable.
Several features of jury service can intensify the impact of what you heard:

• You did not choose the exposure. You were summoned. Unlike a journalist or detective who selected this work, you were placed in front of disturbing material as a civic obligation.
• You could not look away. During testimony or evidence presentation, you could not close your eyes, leave the room, or change the subject. Your job required full attention.
• You could not talk about it during the trial. Jurors are instructed not to discuss the case — including with spouses, friends, or therapists — until deliberations end. Bottling up reactions for days or weeks can compound their impact.
• You bore the weight of the decision. Unlike spectators, you had to weigh the evidence and decide. That responsibility doesn’t simply evaporate when the verdict is read.
• You may feel isolated afterward. Few people in your life understand what you sat through. Even loving family members may not know what to ask.

None of this is a flaw in you. It is a feature of the role you were asked to play.

A note specifically for men.

Men sometimes hesitate to seek help after traumatic exposure — partly because of the cultural expectation that men should “handle it,” and partly because some of the best resources for trauma survivors are housed in organizations with names that sound like they serve only women.

We want to be clear: every resource listed in this guide serves men. The Women’s Center of Tarrant County, despite its name, explicitly serves “survivors of all ages and genders.” One Safe Place serves all genders. SafeHaven runs a dedicated Men’s Program in Arlington. The DA’s Victim Assistance Coordinators serve every victim and witness, regardless of sex. If something you saw or heard is bothering you, you are entitled to the same help anyone else would get.

Part 2: What Can I Do?

In the first days and weeks.

The earliest period after a difficult trial is when small, deliberate choices matter most. A few things that have helped other jurors:

Expect the reactions, and let them be normal. Your mind is processing. Trying to force the feelings to stop, or being angry at yourself for having them, generally makes them worse. Treat them like weather — real, sometimes intense, and passing.

Talk about it — now that you can. Once the trial is over, the gag is lifted. You are allowed to discuss your experience, your reactions, and even your impressions of the case (within the limits your judge described). Pick someone you trust who can listen without rushing to fix anything. A spouse, a close friend, a clergy member, a therapist, or a fellow juror can all be appropriate, depending on the conversation.

Move your body. Trauma lives in the nervous system, not just in thoughts. Walking, stretching, swimming, gardening, or any sustained physical activity helps the body discharge the stress chemistry that built up while you sat still in a courtroom for days.

Sleep, eat, hydrate. These sound obvious. They are also the first things to slip. Protect them on purpose for at least a few weeks.

Limit additional intake. This is not the moment for true-crime podcasts, graphic news, or violent entertainment. Your tolerance for that material is temporarily lower, and there is no reward for testing it.

Delay big decisions if you can. Major life choices made in the immediate aftermath of intense stress are often regretted. If a decision can wait three or four weeks, let it.

Write it down. Many people find it useful to write — by hand or in a private document — about what they witnessed and what they are feeling. Not to publish, not to share, just to externalize. The act of putting words to a memory often reduces its grip.

Resist isolation, even when you want it. Withdrawing feels protective. Beyond a few days, it usually isn’t. Keep at least one or two of your normal social rhythms intact, even if you don’t feel like it.

Part 3: When it’s More than That.

Most jurors find that within four to six weeks, the sharpest edges have dulled. Sleep returns. The intrusive images visit less often. Life resumes its normal proportions.

Sometimes it doesn’t. Reach out to a mental health professional if any of the following are true:

• Symptoms have not improved, or are getting worse, after about a month.
• You cannot sleep, or you sleep but wake exhausted, on most nights.
• Intrusive memories, images, or sounds from the trial are interfering with work, parenting, or relationships.
• You are using alcohol, cannabis, or other substances more than usual to settle yourself.
• You are avoiding things that didn’t used to bother you — driving past the courthouse, watching certain shows, being around children, leaving the house.
• You feel emotionally numb, disconnected from people you love, or like you are watching your own life from the outside.

You are having thoughts of harming yourself or someone else.

If you are in crisis right now

If you are having thoughts of suicide or self-harm, or you are in immediate danger, please reach out tonight — not next week.

• 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline — Call or text 988
• Crisis Text Line — Text HOME to 741741
• MHMR Tarrant County Mental Health Crisis Line (24/7) — Call or text 1-800-866-2465
• Emergency — 911

These lines are answered around the clock by trained counselors. They serve men, women, and people of all gender identities. You do not have to be “severely” in crisis to call. They are also there for the in-between moments.

Part 4: Who Can Help in Tarrant County?

Tarrant County has a strong network of free or low-cost resources for people coping with the aftermath of violent crime — including jurors who have been exposed to it secondhand. Every organization listed below serves men, women, and people of all gender identities, unless otherwise noted.

The Women’s Center of Tarrant County — Rape Crisis & Victim Services.

Serves all genders, despite the name. Their own materials state: “We serve survivors of all ages and genders who have experienced both non-stranger and stranger abuse/assault.” They also serve significant others and family members of victims, which can include people who are emotionally affected by exposure to a case.

Master’s-level therapists provide individual and group counseling. They also offer crisis intervention, criminal justice accompaniment, and assistance with Crime Victims’ Compensation forms. All services are free.

• 24-Hour Crisis Hotline: 817-927-2737
• Appointments (Fort Worth or Arlington): 817-927-4039
• Fort Worth Office: 1723 Hemphill St., Fort Worth, TX 76110 — 817-927-4040 — Mon–Fri, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.
• Arlington Satellite Office: 401 W. Sanford, Ste. 1200, Arlington, TX 76011 — 817-548-1663 — Mon–Thu, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.
• Online: womenscentertc.org

One Safe Place — Family Justice Center

A multi-agency Family Justice Center in Fort Worth that brings together advocates, counselors, law enforcement, and legal services under one roof. Originally focused on domestic violence, but works with anyone affected by crime and trauma. Serves all genders. Main Office: 1100 Hemphill Street, Fort Worth, TX 76104

• Phone: 817-916-4323
• Hours: Walk-in accepted between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m.
• Satellite Office: GRACE, 837 E. Walnut St., Grapevine, TX 76051
• Online: onesafeplace.org

SafeHaven of Tarrant County

Provides crisis services, counseling, and shelter for those affected by domestic violence — and runs a dedicated Men’s Program in Arlington for male survivors and male family members.

• SafeHaven 24-Hour Hotline (Fort Worth): 817-535-6464
• SafeHaven Men’s Program (Arlington): 817-548-0583

Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney — Victim Assistance

The DA’s Victim Assistance Coordinators help victims and witnesses of violent crime navigate the criminal justice system. While their primary mandate is direct victims, they can be a useful starting point for referrals and for connecting jurors back into the right service network. Serves all genders.

• Victim Assistance: 817-884-2740
• Address: Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center, 401 W. Belknap St., Fort Worth, TX 76196
• Hours: Mon–Fri, 7:45 a.m. – 4:45 p.m.
• Family Violence Unit: 817-884-3535

Protective Order Unit: 817-884-1623

Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office — Victim Assistance Unit.

• Victim Assistance Coordinator: 817-884-3697
• Address: 200 Taylor Street, 7th Floor, Fort Worth, TX 76196

Fort Worth Police Department — Victim Assistance

• FWPD Victim Assistance: 817-392-4390

MHMR of Tarrant County (My Health My Resources)

The county’s largest mental health provider. Offers a 24/7 crisis line, screening, and outpatient mental health and substance use services across more than 50 sites in Tarrant County. Serves all genders and ages, regardless of ability to pay.

• Mental Health Crisis Line (24/7): Call or text 1-800-866-2465
• To start services: 817-335-3022
• Online: mhmrtarrant.org

Texas VINE — Victim Information & Notification Everyday

• VINE: 1-877-894-8463 (1-877-TX4-VINE)

National resources (for jurors anywhere)

If you served on a jury outside of Tarrant County, or if you simply prefer a national resource, the following are available:

• 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline — Call or text 988 (24/7)
• Crisis Text Line — Text HOME to 741741 (24/7)
• RAINN National Sexual Assault Hotline — 1-800-656-HOPE (4673) — rainn.org. Serves all genders.
• National Domestic Violence Hotline — 1-800-799-7233 — thehotline.org. Serves all genders.
• Veterans Crisis Line — Call 988 then press 1, or text 838255
• SAMHSA National Helpline (substance use, mental health) — 1-800-662-4357

Find a trauma therapist — psychologytoday.com/us/therapists

Part 5: Finding a Therapist

Look for a licensed therapist with experience in trauma. Useful credentials and search terms:

• Licensed Professional Counselor (LPC), Licensed Clinical Social Worker (LCSW), Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist (LMFT), or psychologist (PhD/PsyD).
• Training in trauma-focused therapies such as EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing), Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT), Prolonged Exposure (PE), or Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (TF-CBT).

Experience working with first responders, veterans, or crime victims — these clinicians regularly treat the kind of exposure-based stress jurors experience.

Psychology Today’s online directory lets you filter by specialty, insurance, gender preference, and location. Most employee assistance programs (EAPs) through your workplace also offer several free sessions and can refer you out.

Don’t underestimate a conversation with your primary care doctor, either. They can screen for sleep issues, evaluate physical symptoms, and refer you into a behavioral health network.

Part 6: For the People Around You

If you have a spouse, partner, parent, adult child, or close friend who served on a difficult jury, this section is for you.

What helps.

• Asking, then listening. “How are you doing with it?” is enough. Let them answer in their own words and at their own pace. You don’t have to fix anything.
• Believing them. If they say something they saw or heard is bothering them, take it seriously. “It was just a trial” minimizes a real experience.
• Patience with mood, sleep, and presence. They may be more irritable, withdrawn, or distractable than usual. Most of this passes.
• Watching for the signs in Part 3, and gently raising the idea of professional help if those signs persist.
• Taking care of yourself. Living alongside someone in distress is its own quiet weight. The same resources in this guide are available to you.

What doesn’t help.

• Asking for graphic details out of curiosity.
• Telling them they should be “over it by now.”
• Assuming silence means they’re fine, or assuming distress means they’re not.
• Pushing them into social or family events they’re not ready for.
• Assuming this only affects women, or that men in your life don’t need to talk about it.

A Final Word about Jury Service.

Jury service is one of the few civic obligations Americans share. Most of the time, it is uneventful. Sometimes, the case you are handed asks more of you than you expected — more attention, more endurance, more contact with the worst of what people can do to each other.

That contact leaves a mark. It can also leave a deeper, quieter understanding of why this work matters: that real people had no choice but to be in the events you were asked to evaluate, and that the system of careful, deliberate strangers weighing the evidence is — for all its flaws — what we have.

Take care of yourself the way you would take care of a friend who had just been through what you went through. With patience. Without judgment. And with the recognition that asking for help is not a sign that something has gone wrong with you. It is a sign that something heavy was placed in your hands, and you are setting it down the right way.

“Healing is a process. Give yourself plenty of time to heal.”

Quick References

Crisis (24/7) — all genders served:

• 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline — Call or text 988
• Crisis Text Line — Text HOME to 741741
• MHMR Tarrant Mental Health Crisis Line — 1-800-866-2465

Emergency — 911

Tarrant County trauma & victim services — all genders served:

• The Women’s Center of Tarrant County, 24-hr Crisis Hotline — 817-927-2737
• The Women’s Center, appointments — 817-927-4039
• One Safe Place — 817-916-4323
• SafeHaven 24-hr hotline — 817-535-6464
• SafeHaven Men’s Program (Arlington) — 817-548-0583
• Tarrant County DA Victim Assistance — 817-884-2740
• Fort Worth Police Victim Assistance — 817-392-4390
• MHMR Tarrant — 817-335-3022

National — all genders served:

• RAINN National Sexual Assault Hotline — 1-800-656-HOPE (4673)
• National Domestic Violence Hotline — 1-800-799-7233
• Veterans Crisis Line — 988, press 1
• SAMHSA National Helpline — 1-800-662-4357
• Find a therapist — psychologytoday.com/us/therapists

Thank you for your service. Please be gentle with yourself.

Since the Texas Supreme Court decided Gregory v. Chohan in June 2023, civil plaintiffs’ lawyers across Texas have been keeping a close eye on how to best prove up noneconomic damages. The Chohan plurality threw cold water on the old “shocks the conscience” standard, rejected “unsubstantiated anchoring” arguments (fighter jets, expensive paintings, cost-per-mile calculations), and held that plaintiffs must demonstrate “a rational connection, grounded in the evidence, between the injuries suffered and the amount awarded.” But the plurality also declined to “place any limits . . . on the reasons by which a plaintiff might justify the amount.”

That ambiguity left a lot of trial lawyers guessing. The Dallas Court of Appeals’ March 26, 2026 decision in SL Nabors Commercial/Residential Roofing, Ltd. v. Allen, No. 05-24-00854-CV, offers a roadmap to proving up noneconomic damages verdict post-Chohan.

What Happened in Nabors

Rico Delmon Allen was injured in a July 19, 2021 car accident caused by an SL Nabors roofing truck. Liability was directed against the defendant at the close of evidence. Nabors conceded it could not present evidence to support submitting a negligence question to the jury. Damages were the only live issue, and the evidence the jury heard was substantial.

Allen went to the emergency room hours after the crash with head, shoulder, and back pain. Two days later, he saw chiropractor Dr. Zachary Weaks and reported neck, back, finger, arm, shoulder, leg, and hip pain along with dizziness, headaches, numbness, and sleep loss. Even with muscle relaxers, Allen rated his back, finger, and arm pain at 10 out of 10, his shoulder and rib pain at 9, and his neck pain at 8. He attended twenty chiropractic visits over approximately eleven months. At his final evaluation, he still reported severe difficulty with overhead reaching, household chores, making a bed, carrying anything over ten pounds, and washing his back.

Allen completed detailed Neck and Back Indices documenting the functional consequences. He rated his sleep as “completely disturbed” with 5-7 hours of sleeplessness, reported being unable to lift or carry anything, experiencing pain that restricted his social life to his home, and suffering moderate headaches that came frequently. An MRI revealed disk protrusion at C-3 and C-4 with potential narrowing of the spinal canal. Dr. Zeshan Chaudhry diagnosed cervical and lumbar facet mediated pain and performed three fluoroscopy-guided steroid injections between May and September 2022. Allen stayed awake for each injection because one of his “biggest fears in life” was going under anesthesia and “not waking up to see my kids.” Each injection cost $7,950. He described them as “the worst thing ever.” He also underwent shoulder surgery to repair a torn labrum.

Both treating physicians testified the damage was permanent. Dr. Chaudhry explained that a herniated disk will not heal itself and is “forever compromised in terms of its integrity.” Dr. Brett Boeke, Allen’s chiropractic expert, testified that the injury “actually ages the disks much more” and expected Allen to be susceptible to future injuries and to “need pretty constant pain meds” for the rest of his life.

The real-world consequences were equally concrete. Allen’s annual income dropped from roughly $80,000 to $40,000 after he was forced to leave field sales work for a call center and then bounce between unstable jobs. His mother moved in to help raise his two young children because pain medication left him “groggy and sleepy.” He stopped coaching his son’s basketball team. He could not help his kids with homework because sitting and reading for extended periods gave him headaches. He was evicted because he could not afford the payments. His marriage ended; he testified his injuries “basically shut the door” on the relationship. He testified that the accident “drained” him mentally and that he lost his faith. He was 44 years old at trial.

Worth noting is what Allen’s counsel did not do, because SL Nabors argued on appeal that some of it was required post-Chohan. Allen’s counsel did not offer a per-diem calculation like the $16-per-day figure approved in Garza or the $25-per-day National Guard wage anchor approved in Elizondo. He did not multiply a daily dollar figure by Allen’s days of suffering or by his remaining life expectancy. He did not present expert testimony assigning a specific dollar value to Allen’s pain, mental anguish, or loss of enjoyment of life. He did not introduce evidence quantifying what amount of money would enable Allen to better cope with his injuries or restore his emotional health, one of the examples the Chohan plurality offered as a potential rational basis. SL Nabors argued this absence was fatal, that without a mathematical formula or quantifying expert, the jury was left to “simply pick a number and put it in the blank.” The Dallas Court disagreed, and that disagreement is the core of why this opinion matters.

On this record, the jury awarded Allen:

• $250,000 for past physical pain and mental anguish
• $100,000 for future physical pain and mental anguish
• $200,000 for past physical impairment
• $115,000 for future physical impairment
• $188,743.73 for past medical care
• $200,000 for future medical care
• $25,000 for past loss of earning capacity

SL Nabors appealed, challenging the noneconomic damages and future medical expenses as legally and factually insufficient. The Dallas Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice Barbare, affirmed the damages awards in full.

The Court’s Analysis and Why It Matters

The Framework the Court Applied

The court restated the Chohan test cleanly. To survive a legal-sufficiency challenge to noneconomic damages, a plaintiff must show:

1. The existence of compensable mental anguish: evidence of the “nature, duration, and severity” of the anguish suffered, and
2. A rational connection, grounded in the evidence, between the injuries suffered and the amount awarded.

If “the reason offered in justification of the amount awarded is rational and does not partake of prohibited motives, courts should defer to the factfinder’s verdict.”

That framing matters. The Chohan plurality set up a two-part test, and Nabors shows us what a successful plaintiff’s showing looks like under each prong.

Prong One: Existence of Compensable Mental Anguish

The evidence Allen marshaled was thorough and specific, the kind of record that makes prong one straightforward.

Medical evidence with specificity. Allen immediately sought emergency care the day of the accident. Two days later, he was examined by a chiropractor and reported pain at specific numerical levels on a 1-to-10 scale for eight separate body regions. He completed Neck and Back Indices with numerical ratings for specific functional limitations, including sleep disruption, inability to lift, inability to concentrate, and restriction of social life to the home. He had twenty chiropractic visits over eleven months. He underwent an MRI that revealed disk protrusion at C-3 and C-4. He received three fluoroscopy-guided facet joint steroid injections, staying awake because his “biggest fear in life” was not waking from anesthesia, not waking up to see his kids. He had shoulder surgery to repair a labrum tear.

Testimony about real-world impact. Allen’s income dropped from roughly $80,000 to $40,000 a year. He lost his job as a field sales representative and had to move to a call center. He was eventually evicted. His marriage ended. His mother moved in to help care for his two young children because pain medication left him groggy. He stopped coaching his son’s basketball team. He could no longer help his kids with homework because sitting and reading for that long gave him headaches.

Medical opinion on permanence. Dr. Chaudhry explained that a herniated disk will not heal itself and is “forever compromised.” Dr. Boeke testified Allen would be susceptible to future injuries and would “need pretty constant pain meds.”

This is the “nature, duration, and severity” evidence Chohan demands, and the Dallas court had no trouble finding it legally and factually sufficient.

Prong Two: The Rational Connection

Here’s where the opinion becomes genuinely useful. Allen’s counsel did two things at closing that the court explicitly credited:

1. He suggested specific ranges anchored to the evidence. Counsel suggested “at least $500,000” for past physical pain and mental anguish and between $200,000 and $250,000 for future physical pain and suffering.
2. He tied those numbers to an identifiable rationale: “lost time,” memories “you don’t get back,” “things that are sticking with him for the rest of his life.”

The jury then awarded less than counsel requested: $250,000 for past pain and mental anguish (half of the suggested $500,000) and $100,000 for future (below the suggested $200,000 to $250,000 range).

The court made that point explicitly: “The jury’s awards were less than the recommended ranges by Allen’s attorney in closing argument; therefore, the jury did not ‘simply pick a number and put it in a blank,’ as SL Nabors argues.” The court cited the Dallas Court’s own post-Chohan decision in Bilal v. Khan, where a $140,000 past mental anguish award was upheld in part because it was “far less than the $1.75 million the plaintiff asked the jury to award.”

The practical takeaway for plaintiffs’ lawyers: a rational suggested range, tied to evidence, that comes in higher than what the jury ultimately awards, gives reviewing courts a concrete way to find the “rational connection” Chohan requires.

The Other Cases: Garza and Elizondo

The Nabors court then surveyed what other Texas appellate courts have done post-Chohan, and this is where the opinion becomes especially valuable as a roadmap.

Garza v. Escamilla, 712 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.)

In Garza, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld noneconomic damages where plaintiff’s counsel offered the jury a “simple calculation”: sixteen dollars per day, or one dollar for every waking hour in the day during which the plaintiff experienced loss. That per-unit anchor, tied to the plaintiff’s lived experience rather than to extrinsic values like fighter jets, passed muster.

Elizondo v. Reyna, No. 04-24-00284-CV, 2025 WL 2462764 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.)

In Elizondo, the San Antonio Court approved a more sophisticated per-day calculation. Counsel suggested $25 per day, an amount the evidence showed was approximately one hour of National Guard pay, multiplied by the 1,625 days between the crash and closing argument, for past mental anguish and past physical impairment. For future damages, counsel used $10 to $20 per day multiplied by the plaintiff’s 11,680-day remaining life expectancy.

Notice what made these calculations work. They weren’t pulled from nothing. The Garza dollar-per-waking-hour was anchored to the plaintiff’s daily experience. The Elizondo $25-per-day was anchored to an hour of the plaintiff’s actual wage. Neither was the kind of “unsubstantiated anchoring” Chohan rejected. Neither was analogized to a fighter jet, a Rothko painting, or the defendant’s revenue.

The Critical Caveat: Per-Diem Calculations Are Not Required

Here is the point plaintiffs’ lawyers most need to internalize from Nabors. After discussing Garza and Elizondo, the Dallas Court wrote:

“However, to the extent SL Nabors argues that suggested calculations are required to withstand a sufficiency challenge, we do not interpret Gregory as changing the law to require such evidence to uphold non-economic damage awards. Rather, these cases illustrate one method by which a plaintiff may assist the jury in calculating damages.”

This matters enormously. Some commentators read Chohan as essentially mandating a mathematical formula, that plaintiffs now had to break down noneconomic damages into per-day, per-hour, or per-event units to survive appellate review. Nabors says no. A per-diem or unit-based calculation is one permissible way to create a rational connection, not the only way.

In Nabors itself, Allen’s counsel did not use a per-diem calculation. He suggested ranges tied to themes, including lost memories, lost time, and lifelong consequences, and the court held that sufficient because the reasons given were “rational and grounded in the evidence.”

Physical Impairment: The Same Framework Applies

The court’s analysis of the $200,000 past and $115,000 future physical impairment awards tracked the same approach. Physical impairment, sometimes called loss of enjoyment of life, must be “substantial and extend beyond any pain, suffering, and mental anguish.” The evidence here showed exactly that:

• Allen had coached his son’s basketball team; he stopped two years before trial
• He played soccer with his daughter; “on pause”
• Family bowling and swimming trips; no longer possible
• He couldn’t lift his own son due to pain
• He felt he was “letting down his children”

The court applied the same Chohan framework and found the rational connection between evidence and dollar amount. Notably, the charge included a specific instruction that the jury should not “twice compensate” for the same loss. The court presumed the jury followed that instruction.

Future Medical Expenses: A Separate Standard, but Parallel Reasoning

Future medical expenses are governed by a different doctrinal test than noneconomic damages, but the court’s treatment is instructive. A plaintiff must show a “reasonable probability” that future expenses will be necessary. Expert testimony is preferred but not required.

The $200,000 future medical award was supported by:

• Dr. Chaudhry and Dr. Boeke both testifying future care was likely
• $188,743.73 in past medical expenses (unchallenged) over three years
• Each steroid injection cost $7,950; Allen had three pretrial
• Allen testified he had not sought further treatment because he could not afford it
• He wanted mental health counseling he had not been able to access
• He was 44 at trial, with a long life ahead

The court noted the jury awarded only about $11,000 more for future medical than past, a modest extrapolation from the proven three-year cost. That’s exactly the kind of evidence-grounded reasoning that survives appellate review.

What This Means for Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Practical Takeaways

For the trial bar reading this case after Chohan, a few things crystallize.

First, build the “nature, duration, and severity” record with specificity. Generalized testimony about sadness and hardship will not carry the day. Numerical pain ratings, functional indices, specific activities the client can no longer do, specific relationships damaged, specific opportunities lost: that’s the foundation. Nabors shows how much detail is enough.

Second, the anchor in closing argument matters, and it must be tied to the evidence. Fighter jets, paintings, and cost-per-mile arguments are dead. But per-diem calculations anchored to the client’s actual experience (Garza), per-hour calculations tied to the client’s actual wages (Elizondo), or suggested ranges tied to thematic descriptions of loss (Nabors) all work.

Third, ask for more than you expect, but not absurdly more. Courts have repeatedly cited the fact that jury awards came in below plaintiff’s requests as evidence the jury engaged in rational deliberation. A suggested range that is itself grounded in the evidence, with the jury coming in lower, is the strongest post-Chohan record.

Fourth, connect the dollars to the evidence thematically. Even without a per-diem calculation, counsel in Nabors tied the requested number to identifiable concepts: memories lost, lifelong consequences, time that cannot be recovered. Those are not “unsubstantiated anchors.” They are articulated reasons grounded in the plaintiff’s testimony.

Fifth, preserve the physical impairment distinction. Physical impairment is a separate element of damages that “encompasses the loss of the injured party’s former lifestyle.” Develop the evidence of lifestyle loss, including hobbies, family activities, coaching, and parenting limitations, as a distinct category from pain and mental anguish, and make sure the charge preserves the distinction.

A Note on Verdict Comparisons

One method not at issue in Nabors, but flagged by the Chohan plurality in footnote 12, is verdict comparison, the practice of justifying a noneconomic damages amount by reference to amounts awarded in factually similar cases. The Chohan plurality did “not foreclose the possibility that comparison to other cases may play some role in a plaintiff’s effort to establish that a given amount of noneconomic damages is reasonable and just compensation rationally grounded in the evidence.” The plurality declined to “define the permissible uses of verdict comparisons.” The Nabors court did not address this method because Allen’s counsel did not use it, and SL Nabors did not argue its absence was fatal. Plaintiffs’ lawyers considering a verdict-comparison approach should watch for the first Texas appellate opinion to engage with the method substantively, because until then, the metes and bounds of permissible comparison remain open.

What This Means for Lay Readers

If you’re reading this as someone who has been injured or who has lost a loved one, here’s the plain-English version. Texas used to ask appellate courts a fuzzy question about noneconomic damages: “Does this number shock the conscience?” The Texas Supreme Court in 2023 said that question was too elastic and demanded something more rigorous, a rational reason, grounded in the evidence, for the dollar amount awarded.

That ruling was widely perceived as a blow to injured plaintiffs because it overturned a $15 million wrongful death verdict. But Nabors shows that plaintiffs can absolutely still win substantial noneconomic damages awards post-Chohan. They just have to build the record carefully and argue the dollar amount to the jury in a principled way. A plaintiff with detailed medical records, specific functional limitations, credible testimony about lifestyle loss, and a lawyer who ties the requested dollar amount to the evidence in closing can expect the verdict to hold up on appeal.

Bottom Line

Nabors is the decision plaintiffs’ lawyers have been waiting for. It affirms that:

• Substantial noneconomic damages (here, $665,000 across four categories) can survive Chohan review
• Per-diem or unit-based calculations (Garza, Elizondo) are permitted but not required
• A principled suggested range, tied to themes grounded in the evidence, with the jury awarding less than requested, creates the “rational connection” Chohan demands
• Detailed medical evidence, functional indices, and specific testimony about lost activities and relationships build the foundation

For lawyers preparing the next wave of personal injury trials in Texas, Nabors deserves careful study alongside Chohan, Bilal, Cannon, Garza, and Elizondo. Read together, they sketch out a workable post-Chohan playbook, one that respects the Supreme Court’s demand for rationality while preserving juries’ traditional role in translating human suffering into compensation.

In Texas, being engaged in criminal activity does not automatically eliminate your right to claim self-defense. It costs you a legal presumption, not the defense itself. A landmark 2026 decision from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cuevas v. State, made this distinction clear — and reversed a murder conviction because prosecutors spent an entire trial telling the jury something that was not the law.

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What Did the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Decide in Cuevas v. State?

On April 2, 2026, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in Cuevas v. State, No. PD-0144-25. The court reversed Victor Hugo Cuevas’s murder conviction and ordered a new trial. The reason? Prosecutors repeatedly told the jury — from voir dire through closing argument — that a person cannot claim self-defense if they were committing a crime at the time. The trial judge approved that position at every turn. The Court of Criminal Appeals said that was wrong, and that it caused real harm.

The facts were dramatic. Cuevas went to a parking lot in Fort Bend County to sell marijuana. According to his testimony and that of a witness, the buyer — Ose — pressed a gun to Cuevas’s head, robbed him of his marijuana and phone, and then threatened to kill him as he cocked his weapon. Cuevas fired seven shots into the car. Ose died. Cuevas was charged with murder and claimed self-defense. The jury convicted him anyway.

At sentencing, however, the same jury found that Cuevas acted under sudden passion — a finding that requires believing the defendant’s version of events. The court saw this for what it was: a jury that believed Cuevas’s story but thought the law did not allow them to acquit him because he was dealing drugs. That misunderstanding cost Cuevas his self-defense claim.

What Is the Actual Law on Self-Defense in Texas?

Texas self-defense law under Tex. Penal Code § 9.32 has two distinct layers. Confusing them is a serious — and surprisingly common — mistake.

Layer One: The Right to Claim Self-Defense

Under § 9.32(a), a person is justified in using deadly force when they reasonably believe it is immediately necessary to protect themselves against another person’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. The statute does not say anything about criminal activity stripping away this right. If you are facing a genuine threat of death or serious bodily injury, you may use deadly force to defend yourself — even if you were doing something illegal at the time.

Layer Two: The Presumption of Reasonableness

Under § 9.32(b), there is a separate, additional benefit available to defendants in certain situations: a presumption that their belief in the necessity of deadly force was reasonable. To get this presumption, the defendant must not have been engaged in criminal activity at the time (other than a Class C misdemeanor traffic violation). They also must not have provoked the confrontation, and the threat must involve specific qualifying conduct by the other person.

This is where the prosecutor in Cuevas got it wrong — repeatedly and prejudicially. Being involved in criminal activity does not eliminate the underlying self-defense right. It only removes the presumption. The defendant still gets to argue self-defense. They just have to prove it the hard way, without the legal head start that the presumption provides.

What Is the “Presumption of Reasonableness” and Why Does It Matter?

Think of the presumption as a head start in a race. Without it, both sides start at the same line and the jury weighs the evidence with no thumb on the scale. With the presumption, the defendant starts ahead — the jury is instructed to assume the belief in deadly force was reasonable unless the State proves otherwise.

Losing the presumption does not mean losing the defense. It means the defendant has to convince the jury of reasonableness through evidence and argument rather than through a legal instruction that tells the jury to presume it. That is a harder path. But it is still a path.

The Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized this point in its analysis. An inapplicable but legally correct instruction that purports to benefit a defendant would generally not harm a defendant. The danger arises when prosecutors take that instruction and invert it — telling the jury it means the defendant has no defense at all. That is exactly what happened in Cuevas.

When Should the Presumption Instruction Go to the Jury?

This is the procedural crux of the case. Texas law requires a trial court to instruct the jury on “the law applicable to the case.” A presumption instruction only qualifies as applicable law if the presumed fact is actually in dispute. Under Tex. Penal Code § 2.05(b)(1), the existence of a presumed fact must be submitted to the jury “unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the presumed fact.”

In Cuevas, it was undisputed — admitted by the defendant himself on the stand — that he was involved in criminal activity when the shooting occurred. The presumption was never triggered. Putting it in the jury charge anyway was error because it gave the prosecutor a loaded weapon: a legitimate-looking instruction that she spent the entire trial misrepresenting to the jury.

How Did the Court Analyze the Harm?

Because the error was objected to at trial, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the Almanza standard: the conviction is reversed if the defendant suffered “some harm” — meaning actual harm, not merely theoretical harm. The court evaluated four factors.

The Jury Charge

The abstract portion of the charge correctly stated the presumption language. The application paragraph did not explicitly reference it. Normally that would weigh against harm, since the application paragraph is the “heart and soul” of the jury charge. But the application paragraph used the phrase “reasonably believing,” which the court found logically linked to the abstract presumption instruction — incorporating it by reference. This factor weighed only slightly in the State’s favor.

Other Relevant Record Information

The State previewed its misstatement of the law during voir dire with slide presentations telling the jury that deadly force is reasonable only if the defendant “was NOT engaged in criminal activity.” The trial judge overruled every defense objection and sustained the State’s objection when defense counsel tried to correct the record in his opening statement. The court noted that the trial judge “consistently put the stamp of judicial approval on the State’s misstatements of law.” This factor weighed heavily in favor of harm.

The Evidence

The court of appeals had found the evidence of guilt “overwhelming.” The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. The drug deal happened in a public parking lot in front of a restaurant, with witnesses all around. Cuevas left his cell phone and marijuana in Ose’s car — evidence that the robbery was a surprise. A third-party witness, Jesse Richey, testified that two weeks before the shooting, Ose had told him he planned to rob someone named Victor and called him “an easy lick.” That testimony came from outside Cuevas’s circle entirely. This factor weighed at least moderately in favor of harm.

Arguments of Counsel

The State’s rebuttal argument doubled down on the misstatement: “He cannot use deadly force to protect against the imminent commission of aggravated robbery if he’s also committing another crime. You can’t do it.” Defense counsel objected. The judge overruled it. The rebuttal came last — after the defense had already closed — giving Cuevas no opportunity to respond. This factor weighed at least moderately in favor of harm.

Weighing all four factors together, the court found that Cuevas suffered at least some harm. The conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

What Was the Role of the Sudden Passion Finding?

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the opinion involves what happened at the punishment phase. After convicting Cuevas of murder, the same jury found that he acted under the influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause — a finding under Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(d) that reduced the offense from a first-degree to a second-degree felony.

Both sides told the jury during punishment arguments that a sudden passion finding required believing Cuevas’s version of events. The State said so explicitly. The Court of Criminal Appeals drew a stark inference from this: the jury believed that Cuevas had been threatened with deadly force and reacted in the heat of the moment, but thought the law barred a self-defense acquittal because he was dealing drugs. The jury’s finding of sudden passion combined with its rejection of self-defense suggests it believed the defendant’s story but also believed the State’s interpretation of the presumption issue, and therefore thought its hands were tied.

That is not how self-defense law works in Texas. And that mistaken belief, reinforced by the prosecutor and endorsed by the trial court, is precisely what the Court of Criminal Appeals corrected.

What Does This Mean for Your Self-Defense Case?

If you or someone you love is facing an assault or murder charge and the facts involve an element of self-defense, the legal nuances matter enormously. A few key takeaways from Cuevas:

Being engaged in illegal activity does not eliminate a self-defense claim. You lose the presumption of reasonableness, but you retain the right to argue that your belief in the need for deadly force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. That argument can still win — it is just harder to make without the legal presumption.

Prosecutors sometimes misstate this law. The misstatement in Cuevas was not subtle. It was repeated from voir dire through closing arguments, in slide presentations, in hypotheticals, and in rebuttal — all while the trial judge approved it. Defense counsel must be vigilant about objecting to these misstatements and protecting the record.

The jury charge matters. Improper instructions — even those that look facially correct — can be weaponized by prosecutors to mislead juries. Experienced criminal defense lawyers fight hard during the charge conference, precisely because what goes into the charge shapes what arguments can be made to the jury.

If you are facing a serious violent crime charge in Texas where self-defense is at issue, do not try to navigate this alone. Speak with a Texas homicide defense attorney who understands how courts analyze self-defense claims — and how to protect your rights at every stage of trial. Schedule a free consultation with Varghese Summersett today.

A Real Example: Varghese Summersett’s Track Record in Serious Violent Cases

The legal principles in Cuevas are not abstract. They play out in courtrooms across Texas every week. Varghese Summersett has secured Not Guilty verdicts at jury trial in murder cases — including a 2016 acquittal in a case tried to verdict. Results like these require more than knowing the law. They require attorneys who can identify the theory, construct the argument, protect the charge, and deliver it in front of a jury under pressure. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.

What to Expect From Varghese Summersett

When your life and freedom are on the line, you deserve attorneys who have been here before. At Varghese Summersett, we handle serious violent crime charges — including murder, manslaughter, and aggravated assault — across Texas. Here is what you can expect from our team:

Experienced trial attorneys. Our lawyers have tried serious felonies to verdict, including murder cases. We know how to build and preserve a self-defense record from day one — including voir dire, the charge conference, and closing arguments.

Board-certified criminal defense. The firm has three attorneys board-certified in Criminal Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization — a distinction held by fewer than one percent of Texas lawyers. Board certification means demonstrated expertise, peer review, and ongoing testing in your specific area of law.

A team approach. With 70+ legal professionals across Fort Worth, Dallas, Southlake, and Houston, we have the depth to handle complex, high-stakes cases without cutting corners.

Relentless advocacy. From the moment you call, our attorneys are working on your case. We fight pretrial motions, charge conferences, and — when necessary — trial. Over 1,100 five-star reviews reflect a commitment to standing beside clients at every step.

Award-Winning Legal Excellence

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Watch: Self-Defense and Deadly Force in Texas

Frequently Asked Questions: Self-Defense and Criminal Activity in Texas

Can you claim self-defense in Texas if you were committing a crime?

Yes. Texas law does not bar a self-defense claim simply because the defendant was engaged in criminal activity at the time. What criminal activity does is eliminate the presumption of reasonableness under Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b). The defendant must still prove reasonable belief in the necessity of deadly force through evidence and argument — but the right to raise self-defense remains intact. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals confirmed this in Cuevas v. State (2026).

What is the “presumption of reasonableness” in Texas self-defense law?

Under § 9.32(b) of the Texas Penal Code, a defendant’s belief that deadly force was immediately necessary is presumed to be reasonable if they were not engaged in criminal activity (other than a Class C traffic violation), did not provoke the confrontation, and the other person was committing certain qualifying acts. The presumption functions like a legal head start — the jury is instructed to assume reasonableness unless the State disproves it. Defendants who were committing crimes at the time lose this presumption but do not lose the underlying defense.

What happened in Cuevas v. State?

In Cuevas v. State, No. PD-0144-25 (Tex. Crim. App. April 2, 2026), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a Fort Bend County murder conviction because prosecutors repeatedly told the jury that the defendant could not claim self-defense since he was involved in a drug deal. That was a misstatement of the law. The actual law only cost him the presumption of reasonableness — not the self-defense claim itself. The court found the error caused actual harm and ordered a new trial.

What is “sudden passion” in a Texas murder case?

Under Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(d), a defendant charged with murder may argue during the punishment phase that they acted under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause. If the jury finds this by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is reduced from a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony — carrying 2 to 20 years instead of 5 to 99 years. In Cuevas, the jury’s sudden passion finding at punishment — after convicting at guilt-innocence — strongly suggested the jury believed the defendant’s account of events but felt barred from acquitting due to his criminal activity.

What is the Almanza harm standard in Texas criminal appeals?

Under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), the standard for reversible jury charge error depends on whether the error was objected to at trial. If the error was objected to, the conviction is reversed if the defendant suffered “some harm.” If the error was not objected to, the higher standard of “egregious harm” applies. Courts evaluating harm look at the jury charge as a whole, arguments of counsel, the evidence, and any other relevant record information.

If self-defense is part of your case, every decision matters — from the first phone call to the last word of closing argument. Contact Varghese Summersett for a free consultation with a Texas criminal defense attorney who knows how to fight for you.

Motions for Summary Judgment filed in Texas on or after March 1, 2026 are subject to new rules and deadlines that apply to the movant, nonmovant, and the court. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a has been completely rewritten, and the procedural habits (and tactics) that governed summary judgment practice for decades are no longer operative.

This article is a practitioner’s guide to the new rule. It covers what changed, why it changed, how the new deadline structure works in practice, and what plaintiff’s counsel, defense counsel, and courts need to do differently starting now.

Texas Rule 166a: What Changed on March 1, 2026

The Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 293 and House Bill 16 during the 89th Legislative Session, mandating a top-to-bottom revision of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a. SB 293 required strict scheduling for hearings and rulings to end the era of motions languishing on trial court dockets. HB 16 modified those judicial action timelines, extending certain deadlines from 45 to 60 days and allowing the 90-day window under limited circumstances. The Texas Supreme Court finalized the amendments and signed them on February 27, 2026 (Misc. Docket No. 26-9012). The changes took effect March 1, 2026, and apply to every motion for summary judgment filed on or after that date.

The goals were speed, consistency, and accountability. For years, summary judgment motions in Texas state courts could linger indefinitely. A motion could sit on a docket for months with no hearing set, no ruling issued, and no mechanism to force a resolution. The amended rule changes all of that by imposing mandatory deadlines on both parties and the court itself.

The court’s comment accompanying the 2026 revision makes clear that the rewrite is procedural, not substantive. The underlying legal standards for granting or denying summary judgment have not changed. What has changed is everything about how those motions move through the system.

TRCP Rule 166a (2026)

Old Rule vs. New Rule: Side-by-Side Comparison

Here is how the key provisions changed under the 2026 rewrite. The substantive legal standards for granting or denying summary judgment are unchanged; everything below is procedural.

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Traditional vs. No-Evidence: The Two Types of Texas Summary Judgment Motions

The amended rule formally defines each motion type, clarifying both the burden of proof and when each can be filed:

A traditional motion for summary judgment argues that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The movant carries the burden of establishing this through evidence attached to the motion. A traditional motion may be filed at any time after the non-moving party has appeared or answered in the case.

A no-evidence motion for summary judgment argues that the opposing party has no evidence to support one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which that party would bear the burden of proof at trial. Here the burden shifts: the movant identifies the elements it is challenging, and the non-movant must produce some evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on those specific elements. A no-evidence motion may only be filed after an adequate time for discovery. Filing one prematurely gives the non-movant a clear path to defeat it under Rule 166a(d)(3).

A party may also file a combined motion raising both traditional and no-evidence grounds. This is common when the movant believes it can win on either theory, and the rule expressly permits combining both into a single filing.

Mandatory Titling Requirements Under Amended TRCP 166a

One of the most practical changes under the revised rule is a mandatory titling requirement. Every summary judgment motion must now be titled as one of the following:

• “Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment”
• “No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment”
• “Combined Motion for Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment”

An incorrect or absent title is not grounds to deny the motion outright. However, a court may return the motion for correction, which could restart or delay the procedural timeline. Getting the title right from the start avoids that friction entirely.

If a party wants an oral hearing on the motion, that request must now appear in the title of the motion or response itself, not buried in the body of a filing.

Backward-Looking vs. Forward-Looking Deadlines

The single biggest structural shift in the 2026 rewrite is the direction deadlines run. Under the old rule, every briefing deadline looked backward from the hearing. Under the new rule, every deadline looks forward from the filing date. That one change has cascading effects on how litigants must manage their calendars.

Under the old system, the hearing date was the anchor. A non-movant’s response was due seven days before the hearing. That meant the response deadline was only knowable once a hearing was scheduled, and if no hearing was ever set, there was effectively no deadline at all. A party could file a motion and then let it sit without setting a hearing, leaving the opposing party in a state of procedural limbo. The system rewarded delay and created asymmetric pressure on non-movants who had to track floating dates tied to an event that might never occur.

The new system flips that entirely. The filing date is now the anchor for everything. The non-movant’s response is due 21 days after filing. The movant’s reply is due 7 days after the response. The court must set a hearing or submission within 60 days of filing. The court must issue a written ruling within 90 days of the hearing or submission. None of these deadlines depend on anything happening in the future. The moment a motion is filed, every participant in the case, including the judge, is on a defined timeline.

In practical terms, this means the old habit of filing a motion and waiting to see what happens is gone. Forward-looking deadlines demand that all parties treat the filing date as the starting gun, not a placeholder. If you are on the receiving end of a summary judgment motion, your preparation window is fixed and finite from day one.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a Deadline Timeline: Litigants and Courts

Deadlines for Litigants

Every party deadline under the new rule runs from the filing date of the motion. There is no ambiguity about when the clock starts.

• Day 0: Motion for summary judgment filed. All clocks start.
• Day 21: Non-movant’s response due (or by agreement/leave of court).
• Day 21 + 7: Movant’s reply due within 7 days of the date the response is actually filed, not 7 days from the response deadline. If the non-movant files on Day 15, the reply is due Day 22. If the non-movant files on Day 21, the reply is due Day 28.
• Before hearing: Both parties must submit proposed orders.

Deadlines for the Court

The court operates under its own set of mandatory deadlines, also anchored to the filing date.

• No earlier than Day 35: The earliest date the court may set a hearing or submission.
• By Day 60: The court must have a hearing or submission date set. This extends to Day 90 only if the court’s docket requires it, on a showing of good cause, or if the movant agrees.
• Within 90 days of hearing: The court must sign a written ruling, file it with the clerk, and provide it to the parties.

Maximum Time From Filing to Ruling

Add it up and the outer limits become clear. Under the standard setting window, the court has up to 60 days to set the hearing and then 90 days after that to rule. That puts the absolute maximum at 150 days from filing to written decision, roughly five months. If the court is granted the 90-day extended setting window, the outer limit stretches to 180 days, but only if the court also takes the full 90 days post-hearing to rule. In practice, most cases should resolve well within 150 days.

Under the old rule, there was no outer limit at all. A motion could theoretically sit unresolved for years. The 2026 amendments cap that exposure and give every litigant a reliable window for when a ruling must arrive.

How the New Briefing Deadlines Work Under Amended TRCP 166a

Under the old rule, briefing deadlines were tied to the hearing date. A response was due seven days before the hearing. This created a system where deadlines floated depending on when a court got around to scheduling things. The new rule eliminates that ambiguity entirely. Every deadline now runs from the date the motion is filed.

Response Deadline: 21 Days From Filing

Once a summary judgment motion is filed, the non-moving party has 21 days to file a response. That clock starts ticking the day the motion hits the court’s file, regardless of whether a hearing has been set or even scheduled. Parties can modify this deadline by agreement or leave of court, but the default is firm.

This is a significant shift. Under the prior rule, a non-movant could sometimes rely on a distant hearing date as informal notice of how much preparation time was available. That buffer is gone. The moment you are served with a summary judgment motion, your 21-day clock has started.

Reply Deadline: 7 Days After the Response

After the non-movant files a response, the moving party may file a reply. That reply must be filed within 7 days of the response, unless the parties agree otherwise or the court grants leave.

The rule also now expressly codifies what Texas courts had already recognized in case law: a reply cannot raise new or independent summary judgment grounds. A reply is for addressing the response, not for expanding the motion. There is one narrow exception: a reply may address a new or amended pleading filed after the motion if a ground already asserted in the motion negates an element common to a claim in that new pleading.

Mandatory Court Deadlines Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a

This is where the 2026 amendments represent the most significant departure from prior practice. For the first time, Texas Rule 166a imposes mandatory deadlines on trial courts for setting hearings and issuing written rulings. The rule carves the court’s action window into three distinct zones, each with its own significance.

The Dead Zone: Days 1 Through 35

From the moment a summary judgment motion is filed through the first 35 days, the court cannot set a hearing or submission date. This is a hard floor. No matter how light a court’s docket is, no matter how eager the parties are to move quickly, the rule prohibits any setting during this window.

The dead zone exists for good reason. It gives the non-movant time to file a response before a hearing date is even on the calendar. Under the new rule, the non-movant has 21 days to respond, and the movant then has 7 days from the actual response filing to reply. Locking out any hearing setting for 35 days ensures the briefing cycle has a realistic chance to complete before a date is locked in. Courts and parties should treat this window as preparation time, not idle time.

The Standard Action Window: Days 35 Through 60

Between Day 35 and Day 60 from the filing date is where the court must act. The hearing or submission date must be set somewhere inside this 25-day window under normal circumstances. The clerk is required to immediately bring the motion to the court’s attention upon filing, and the court should be tracking the Day 60 deadline from that point forward.

For litigants, this window matters because it defines when to expect a hearing date to appear on the calendar. If Day 60 approaches with no setting, the court is at risk of missing a mandatory deadline that will show up in quarterly OCA compliance reporting. Practitioners who want an oral argument rather than submission on briefs should have their hearing request in the title of their filing well before this window closes.

The Exception Window: Days 60 Through 90

The rule allows the court to extend the setting deadline out to 90 days from filing, but only in three specific circumstances. The court’s docket must require it, there must be a showing of good cause, or the movant must agree. This is not a default extension. It requires one of those conditions to be satisfied, and courts should document the basis in the record, both for OCA reporting purposes and to protect the setting from a challenge.

The 90-day exception window is not available simply because a case is complex or the parties are still in active discovery. Those concerns are better addressed through a motion to extend the response deadline under Rule 166a(d)(3) or through the initial docket control order. Absent one of the three enumerated bases, the court should have the matter set by Day 60.

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Written Ruling Within 90 Days of the Hearing or Submission

Once the hearing or submission date passes, the court has 90 days to sign a written ruling, file it with the clerk, and provide the ruling to the parties. A court cannot simply take the matter under advisement indefinitely. The full lifecycle from filing to ruling is now expected to run approximately five to six months depending on which setting window the court uses.

Evidence Rules, Withdrawals, and Other Requirements Under Amended Rule 166a

Several additional procedural requirements apply alongside the deadline changes:

Proposed orders: Both the moving party and the non-moving party are now required to submit a proposed order before the hearing or submission date. This is no longer optional.

No oral testimony: The rule explicitly confirms that no oral testimony may be received at a summary judgment hearing. Evidence comes in through the methods specified in the rule: deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, admissions, affidavits, declarations, stipulations, and other authenticated materials.

Late-filed evidence: The court retains discretion to consider evidence filed late, but it must affirmatively indicate that consideration in the official record. This requirement removes ambiguity for appellate review. Under the prior practice, it was sometimes unclear whether a court had actually weighed late-filed materials. The new rule requires the court to say so explicitly, giving both parties a clear record on appeal.

Withdrawals: Informally notifying the court coordinator by email is no longer sufficient. Any withdrawal of a summary judgment motion must be formally filed on the docket and must explicitly identify the original filing date of the motion. That date is what starts the court’s compliance clock under the new reporting requirements. A withdrawal that fails to identify the original filing date leaves the record ambiguous and may not properly stop the clock for OCA tracking purposes.

Discovery not on file: If a party wants to use discovery materials not already in the court’s file as summary judgment evidence, copies or notices with specific references must be filed at the time the motion is filed (for movant’s evidence) or at the time the response is filed (for the non-movant’s evidence).

How to Invoke Rule 166a(d)(3) When Evidence Is Unavailable

The amended rule addresses a recurring scenario: the non-movant needs more time for discovery before it can adequately respond. Under Rule 166a(d)(3), the non-movant may file an affidavit or declaration specifying the reasons why it cannot currently present facts essential to its opposition. Based on that showing, the court has three options: extend the response deadline, deny the motion without prejudice to allow additional discovery, or issue another appropriate order.

The lesson here is that silence is not a strategy. If you need more time, you must formally say so and explain why, in an affidavit or declaration.

How Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a Enforces Compliance

The new deadlines are not aspirational. They are backed by a four-level administrative oversight mechanism designed to make non-compliance a matter of public record.

At the first level, court clerks must report compliance with summary judgment hearing and ruling deadlines to the Office of Court Administration every quarter. At the second level, the OCA compiles that quarterly data into an annual compliance report. At the third level, district court judges must submit semi-annual sworn statements disclosing hours spent on judicial duties, including reviewing filings and drafting opinions, pursuant to the Rules of Judicial Administration. At the fourth and most consequential level, the OCA submits the final annual report to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House by December 31 each year, making any pattern of non-compliance publicly visible at the highest levels of state government.

This four-level chain is new to Texas civil procedure. A judge who routinely misses ruling deadlines will not just face internal docket pressure. The pattern will appear in a report that goes to the Governor’s office and the Legislature.

TRCP 166a Practice Tips for Plaintiff’s Counsel

The new rule changes the rhythm of discovery and motion practice in ways that benefit plaintiffs in some respects and create new pressure in others.

TRCP 166a Practice Tips for Defense Counsel

The amendments create strategic opportunities and obligations for defense attorneys that require a shift in how summary judgment practice is approached.

TRCP 166a Compliance Checklist for Texas Trial Courts

The 2026 amendments place new obligations on trial courts that have no real precedent in Texas civil procedure. Courts that adapt quickly will be better positioned to comply with the rule and avoid OCA scrutiny.